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Virtual Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling 
in the Grey Zones of International Law 
Michael N. Schmitt  
Abstract 
This Article examines remotely conducted election meddling by cyber means in the context 
of international law and asks whether such cyber operations qualify as internationally wrongful 
acts. An internationally wrongful act requires both a breach of a legal obligation owed by one 
State to another under international law and attribution of the act to the former. The Article 
considers three possible breaches related to such meddlingviolation of the requirement to respect 
sovereignty, intervention into the internal affairs of another State, and, when the cyber operations 
are not attributable to the State from which they were launched, breach of the due diligence 
obligation that requires States to ensure cyber operations with serious adverse consequences are 
not mounted from their territory. The Article then examines the various modalities for attributing 
a cyber operation to a State under international law. Whether cyber meddling in another States 
election is unlawful, as well as the severity thereof, determines the range of responses available to 
the victim State. The Article concludes that the law applicable to remotely conducted meddling in 
another States election is unsettled, thereby comprising a normative grey zone ripe for exploitation 
by States and non-State actors.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, outgoing administration 
officials, including President Barack Obama and senior leaders of the intelligence 
community, accused the Russian government of meddling in U.S. elections.1 
European leaders raised similar concerns regarding Russian interference in 
European elections.2 In contrast, President Donald Trump labeled the claims a 
hoax, announced that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putins denials of 
meddling, and called the intelligence agency directors political hacks.3 Now, 
more than a year after his inauguration, President Trump continues to claim that 
the Russians had no impact on our votes whatsoever.4 
The possibility that one State might interfere in the political processes of 
another is hardly shocking. Indeed, the U.S. has a long history of involving itself 
covertly and overtly in foreign elections.5 But targeting a super power with an 
influence campaign that exploited social media and remotely conducting active 
intrusions into its cyber infrastructure marked a significant escalation in election 
meddling.6 Various aspects of the Russian campaign almost certainly violated U.S. 
law, as suggested by the U.S. Department of Justices February 2018 indictment 
under U.S. law of numerous Russians and Russian entities with close ties to the 
government.7 Far less certain is the character of the operations under international 
law. 
This Article addresses the legality of both the Russian influence campaign 
and, since it is a growing phenomenon, cyber meddling in general. It attempts to 
                                                 
1  Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian 
Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/3XXD-8K5C 
[hereinafter Obama Press Release]; OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NATL INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, 
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017) 
[hereinafter ODNI REPORT]. 
2  Rick Noack, Everything We Know so Far about Russian Election Meddling in Europe, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://perma.cc/4XLC-G4JG. 
3  Mark Landler & Michael D. Shear, Indictment Makes Trumps Hoax Claim Harder to Sell, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/a-hoax-indictments-make-
trumps-claim-even-harder-to-maintain.html. 
4  Linda Qui, How Trump Has Split with His Administration on Russian Meddling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/us/politics/trump-russia-administration-fact-
check.html. 
5  Ishaan Tharoor, The Long History of the U.S. Interfering with Elections Elsewhere, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/13/the-long-history-
of-the-u-s-interfering-with-elections-elsewhere. 
6  Andy Greenberg, Everything We Know About Russias Election-Hacking Playbook, WIRED (June 9, 2017), 
perma.cc/UU3W-NUGV. 
7  Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032, 2018 WL 914777, 
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). 
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pinpoint when cyber election meddling amounts to one or more internationally 
wrongful acts, that is, when it is unlawful under international law and identifies 
responses available to the target State under international law. 
Such internationally wrongful acts consist of two elements.8 First, there 
must be a breach of a States legal obligation through either commission or 
omission. Second, the act in question must be attributable to the State concerned 
pursuant to the law of State responsibility. Following the examination of these 
two issues as applied to cyber operations, the Article turns to possible responses 
under international law by a State that is the target of cyber election meddling. 
Determining that many cyber operations lie within a grey zone of legal 
uncertainty, particularly with respect to the applicable legal thresholds for 
unlawfulness,9 it concludes with the authors reflections on the consequences of 
this uncertainty vis-à-vis cyber election meddling. 
II. THE CONTEXT 
The most professional and thorough open-source analysis of the Russian 
influence campaign is the summary of a classified report on the matter prepared 
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) under the auspices of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).10 Released less than two weeks 
before President Trumps inauguration, the reports key findings, offered with a 
high degree of confidence,11 were straightforward: 
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 
aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russias goals were to undermine 
public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and 
harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and 
the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect 
Trump.12 
                                                 
8  Intl Law Commn, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pt. 1, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 26 (2001), reprinted 
in [2001] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). 
9  On grey zones in international cyber law generally, see Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the 
International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INTL L. ONLINE, no. 2, 2017, at 121. 
10  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1. See also the chronology of matter at 2016 Presidential Campaign 
Hacking Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (Feb. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/BYR2-WFVR. On the use 
of cyberspace as a tool of influence, see PIRET PERNIK, INTL CTR. FOR DEF. AND SECURITY, 
HACKING FOR INFLUENCE: FOREIGN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND CYBER-ATTACKS (2018), 
https://perma.cc/VZP4-4L9G. 
11  High confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from 
multiple sources. High confidence does not imply that the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such 
judgments may be wrong. ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. 
12 Id. at ii. 
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The CIA and FBI concurred, also with a high degree of confidence, that 
Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trumps 
election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly 
contrasting her unfavorably to him.13 The NSA agreed, but only with a 
moderate degree of confidence.14 Interestingly, once it appeared that Clinton 
would prevail, the goal of the Russian operations shifted from supporting Trump 
to undermining the coming Clinton presidency.15 
According to the report, the Russian cyber influence campaign, which was 
approved at the highest levels of the Russian government, was multifaceted.16 
In terms of Russian legal responsibility, the most significant operations were 
mounted by Russian military intelligence, the General Staff Main Intelligence 
Directorate or GRU. The GRU hacked into personal email accounts of 
Democratic Party officials and other political figures and exfiltrated a great deal 
of data from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in March 2016.17 It then 
utilized the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to distribute the 
material, including through various exclusive releases to the media.18 Additionally, 
the Russian efforts included hacking into state and local boards of election to 
acquire a capability to exploit them, although apparently no votes were affected.19 
During this period, an active Russian propaganda campaign involving 
numerous media outlets, including RT and Sputnik, was also underway.20 More 
legally significant than this classic form of political propaganda were the social 
media activities of quasi-government trolls who amplified stories of scandals 
about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.21 
The troll farm, known as the Internet Research Agency, was financed by a 
close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence.22 Although the organizations 
                                                 
13 Id.  
14  Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but 
not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Id. at 
13. 
15  Id. at ii. 
16 Id. at 1. 
17  Id.  
18 Id. at 23. On tying Guccifer 2.0 to the Russian government, see Kevin Poulsen and Spencer 
Ackerman, Lone DNC Hacker Guccifer 2.0 Slipped up and Revealed He Was a Russian Intelligence Officer, 
DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/V6W9-TG6N.  
19  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; Joseph Tanfani, Russians Targeted Election Systems in 21 States, but 
Didnt Change Any Results, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/R7WJ-H3N7. 
20  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 34. 
21  Id. at 4. 
22  Id. That ally was Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch who both financed and controlled the 
Internet Research Agency. Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is 
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mission was to support the Russian domestic and international political agenda, 
the extent of control the government exercised over the Internet Research Agency 
remains unclear; a fact that, as will be explained, hinders legal attribution of its 
operations to the State.23 
Consisting of over ninety trolls, the Internet Research Agency spent in 
excess of two million dollars to purchase anti-Clinton and pro-Trump advertising 
on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.24 Using more 
than 120 groups and social media accounts, the objective was not only to convince 
individuals how to vote, but also to keep certain voters from the polls. For 
example, some messaging claimed that Hillary Clinton doesnt deserve the black 
vote!25 Trolls also leveraged social media to encourage nearly forty anti-Clinton 
protests and pro-Trump rallies in swing states.26 
The following year, ODNI released its annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, 
which warned that [f]oreign elections are critical inflection points that offer 
opportunities for Russia to advance its interests both overtly and covertly, and 
that [t]he 2018 US mid-term elections are a potential target for Russian influence 
operations.27 Three days later, the grand jury in Special Counsel Robert Muellers 
                                                 
Known as Putins Cook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-
mueller.html. Trolls are individuals who post offensive, inflammatory, derogatory, false, or 
controversial comments online, often in the hope of inciting a reaction. The name of the activity, 
trolling, is derived from the fishing term that referring to drawing a baited line through the water. 
On trolls, see Zoe Williams, What is an Internet Troll?, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/7G2M-B7JC. 
23  Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html; Adrian Chen, What Muellers 
Indictment Reveals about Russias Internet Research Agency, NEW YORKER (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/DCF4-LY7L; Krishnadev Calamur, What is the Internet Research Agency?, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/WW4E-DJ9W. 
24  Oliver Carroll, St. Petersburg Troll Farm Had 90 Dedicated Staff Working to Influence US Election 
Campaign, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/BL34-WK9F.  
25  Dave Lee, The Tactics of a Russian Troll Farm, BBC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/T3L5-KA4J. 
26  See id. As an example of encouraging rallies, one troll using a false U.S. persona Facebook account 
sent a message to the Florida for Trump account stating: 
Hi there! Im a member of Being Patriotic online community. Listen, weve got 
an idea. Florida is still a purple state and we need to paint it red. If we lose 
Florida, we lose America. We cant let it happen, right? What about organizing 
a YUGE pro-Trump flash mob in every Florida town? We are currently reaching 
out to local activists and weve got the folks who are okay to be in charge of 
organizing their events almost everywhere in FL. However, we still need your 
support. What do you think about that? Are you in? 
  Indictment, supra note 7, at 26.  
27  Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 11 (2018) (Statement of Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Natl Intelligence), 
https://perma.cc/2J27-8AE5. At a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 
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investigation indicted thirteen individuals and three companies associated with the 
trolling operations.28 
Those indicted worked for the Internet Research Agency and were accused 
of conspiring with each other and with persons known and unknown to defraud 
the U.S. by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the 
government through fraud and deceit for the purpose of interfering with the U.S. 
political and electoral processes, including the presidential election of 2016.29 In 
line with the 2017 intelligence communitys assessment, the indictment alleged 
that by early to mid-2016, Defendants operations included supporting the 
presidential campaign of the candidate Donald J. Trump [ ] and disparaging 
Hillary Clinton.30 They also involved the use of social media to criticize 
Republican candidates Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, as well as to support the 
Bernie Sanders campaign.31 
Of particular importance with regard to international law and the issue of 
legal attribution that is discussed below is the allegation that the defendants posed 
as Americans, created false American personas, and stole the identities of real 
Americans in the effort to leverage social media.32 At times, some of the 
defendants even traveled to the U.S. and used U.S.-based cyber infrastructure to 
mask the Russian origin of their activities. 
The week after the indictments were issued, President Trump took to 
Twitter to claim that [t]he results of the 2016 election were not impacted or 
changed and to allege [c]ollusion between Russia and Crooked H, the DNC and 
the Dems.33 He also chastised then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster for 
failing to make the same claim during his address to the Munich Security 
Conference.34 
The U.S. is not alone in falling victim to election cyber meddling. A sampling 
of such cyber operations signals their growing appeal to States wishing to 
manipulate foreign elections. Most well-known are the 2014 CyberBerkut (a group 
                                                 
13, the leaders of the intelligence community made the same assertions. All of them also reaffirmed 
the conclusions contained in the 2017 ODNI REPORT, supra note 1. See Miles Parks, Russian Threat 
to Elections to Persist through 2018, Spy Bosses Warn Congress, NATL PUB. RADIO (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/W7U9-3KSE. 
28  Indictment, supra note 7. 
29  Id. at 23. 
30  Id. at 4. 
31  Id. at 17. 
32  See also Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html. 
33  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 17, 2018, 8:22 PM), 
https://perma.cc/M4HG-UJR6. 
34  Id. 
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of Russian hacktivists) operations targeting the Ukrainian Central Election 
Commission. Elements of the Commissions network were down for nearly 
twenty hours and on election day  a false winner was announced.35 Two years 
later, the GRU, specifically its APT-28 or Fancy Bear hacking unit, 
targeted the German Bundestag, Germanys Foreign and Finance Ministries, and 
the Christian Democratic Unions (the party of Chancellor Angela Merkel) 
systems.36 Likewise, in 2017, Emmanuel Macrons campaign for the French 
Presidency was the object of cyber operations that some experts attribute to 
the GRU.37 The operations involved phishing attacks meant to implant 
malware on the campaigns website. Reportedly, the operations digital 
fingerprints resembled those of the operations against the U.S. Democratic 
National Committee and Angela Merkels campaign the previous year.38 
In November 2017, such activities led U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May
just a week after Trump stated that he believed Putins denial of meddlingto 
announce, We know what you are doing and you will not succeed because you 
underestimate the resilience of our democracies, the enduring attraction of free 
and open societies and the commitment of Western nations to the alliances that 
bind us.39 At the same time, the U.K. Electoral Commission opened an 
investigation into whether the Brexit vote had been targeted.40 
Even Russia purportedly was victimized by cyber meddling during its 
presidential election. In 2018, RT News reported a distributed denial of service 
attack on the Russian Central Election Commission that originated from locations 
in fifteen countries.41 The Commission Chairperson stated that the attack had no 
effect, as its automated election system is not connected to the global network.42 
35  Nikolay Koval, Revolution Hacking, in CYBER WAR IN PERSPECTIVE: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST
UKRAINE 55, 5658 (Kenneth Geers ed., 2015); See also Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly 
Avoided Wanton Destruction from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/N9UE-TVE6. 
36  Sumi Somaskanda, The Cyber Threat to Germanys Elections Is Very Real, ATLANTIC (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/5KA4-MJCR.  
37  Eric Auchard, Macron Campaign Was Target of Cyber Attacks by Spy-Linked Group, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 
2017), https://perma.cc/6FJH-L9LL. 
38 Id.; see also Laura Daniels, How Russia Hacked the French Election, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/F3X6-DZVG.  
39 Theresa May Accuses Vladimir Putin of Election Meddling, BBC (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/HJ5P-5NAF. 
40 Id. 
41 Russian Central Election Commission Comes under Cyberattack, RT NEWS (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/D634-SBWL. 
42 Id. 
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The U.S. does not come to the table with clean hands, having aggressively 
engaged in covert operations to influence elections from the 1950s through the 
1980s, including such notable examples as Guatemala, Iran, Chile, and Nicaragua. 
More recently, the U.S. offered economic aid to Russia in an attempt to bolster 
support for Boris Yeltsin during his 1996 reelection campaign.43 The U.S. 
employed the same technique in support of Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian 
elections, and during the 2005 Iraqi elections Congress blocked a plan to covertly 
fund certain candidates.44 
Four years later, the U.S. unsuccessfully tried to prevent the reelection of 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai.45 An Afghan Supreme Court justice, who was 
one of the two Afghans on the five member Electoral Complaints Commission, 
resigned his post in protest over foreign interference.46 Indeed, there is a long-
standing U.S. practice of supporting both opposition and civic groups active in 
mobilizing voters, as in the 2000 reelection campaign of Slobodan Milosevic and 
on a recurring basis in Belarus in an effort to weaken President Alexander 
Lukashenko.47 As Loch Johnson, has observed: 
Weve been doing this kind of thing since the C.I.A. was created in 
1947. . . . Weve used posters, pamphlets, mailers, bannersyou name it. 
Weve planted false information in foreign newspapers. Weve used what the 
British call King Georges cavalry: suitcases of cash.48 
And, as in Russia, the effort extends beyond de jure organs of government. In 2016, 
for instance, the National Endowment for Democracy, a private non-profit 
organization based in Washington, D.C., awarded nearly $7,000,000 to Russian 
activists and civic organizations.49 
Still, some scholars maintain that there is a notable difference between the 
American and Russian approaches to electoral interference. For example, Thomas 
Carothers argues that post-Cold War U.S. influence activities are distinguishable 
from Russias interference in Western elections, stating: 
                                                 
43  See generally Thomas Carothers, Is the U.S. Hypocritical to Criticize Russian Election Meddling?, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/WU6L-4XJ5. 
44  Id.; see also Scott Shane, Russia Isnt the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-review/russia-isnt-the-only-one-
meddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html. 
45  Sabrina Tavernise et al., With New Afghan Vote, Path to Stability Is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21afghan.html. 
46  Afghan Quits Election Complaints Commission, CNN (Oct. 13, 2009), https://perma.cc/3AUV-J7V3.  
47  Carothers, supra note 43. 
48  Shane, Russia Isnt the Only One, supra note 44. 
49  Russia 2016, NATL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/N4RW-
PFEN. The endowment no longer reports its recipients in light of new laws making the receipt of 
foreign funding unlawful. 
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[U]nlike Russian electoral meddling, U.S. democracy promotion does not 
seek to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, systematically spread lies, favor 
particular candidates, or undercut the technical integrity of elections. On the 
whole, it seeks to help citizens exercise their basic political and civil rights in 
electoral processes, enhance the technical integrity of such processes, and 
increase electoral transparency.50 
Regardless of whether this argument is convincing, the question remains as 
to whether attempts to influence elections, especially in light of current and 
emerging cyber technologies, comport with international law in general. 
III. BREACH OF LEGAL OBLIGATION 
The Obama Administration, despite publicly pointing the finger at Russia 
for engaging in election meddling, never asserted that the actions violated any 
primary rule of international law.51 Instead, when imposing sanctions, President 
Obama merely cited Russias efforts to undermine established international 
norms of behavior, and interfere with democratic governance.52 Similarly, the 
report issued by his intelligence agencies failed to allege that the Russian efforts 
were unlawful under international law. Unsurprisingly, given President Trumps 
skepticism about the Russian operations, the current administration has remained 
silent as to whether Russian actions violated internationally binding norms. 
This reticence begs the question of the legal character of cyber election 
meddling. A number of possibilities, examined below, dominate discussion. The 
two most prominent are violation of the target States sovereignty and 
intervention into the internal affairs of the State holding the elections. A third 
possibility that is often ignored is breach of the obligation to exercise due diligence 
that the States territory is not used as the location from which non-State actors 
or other States launch the cyber meddling operations. 
A. Violation of Sovereignty  
In the case of election meddling, the likeliest breach by a State of its 
international law obligations is violation of the target States sovereignty. Before 
turning to the merits of that possibility, it is first necessary to address a recent 
dispute over whether sovereignty is a primary rule of international law or merely 
a foundational principle from which primary rules such as the prohibitions on 
                                                 
50  Carothers, supra note 43.  
51  Primary rules of international law impose obligations on States, whereas secondary rules set forth 
the general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for 
wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. Intl Law 
Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8.  
52  Obama Press Release, supra note 1.  
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intervention and the use of force emanate.53 This is a key point because if 
sovereignty is not a primary rule of international law, then election meddling 
cannot qualify as an internationally wrongful act in that context. 
Until very recently, and as illustrated below, there appeared to be broad 
consensus that sovereignty is both a principle and a primary rule of international 
law. As a principle, the concept denotes international laws acknowledgment that 
States are primarily responsible for what happens on their territory and that other 
States should respect said competence. On this basis, sovereignty is the fount from 
which various primary rules, like the prohibition on intervention into the internal 
affairs of other States, emerged. At the same time, sovereignty was also 
understood to be a primary rule of international law that is itself susceptible to 
violation. For instance, States have often accused other States of violating their 
sovereignty. The classic examples are non-consensual penetration of national 
airspace or territorial waters by government aircraft or vessels, respectively. In 
fact, at times, a single act might breach both the obligation to respect another 
States sovereignty and a different primary rule derived from the principle of 
sovereignty, as when a State violates another States sovereignty by unlawfully 
employing force within the latters territory. 
This approach had apparently been embraced by the U.N. Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications, a body consisting of State representatives tasked to assess 
norms in cyberspace. In its 2015 consensus report, it concluded: State 
sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty 
apply to the conduct by States of ICT-related activities and to their jurisdiction 
over ICT infrastructure within their territory.54 
Sovereignty as both a principle and rule position was unanimously adopted 
by the International Group of Experts (IGE) that prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
                                                 
53  On intervention, see Section III.B, infra, and accompanying notes. The prohibition on the use of 
force is set forth in U.N. Charter article 2(4) and reflects customary international law. The Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 experts concurred that cyber operations are capable of violating the prohibition, even 
when not accompanied by kinetic operations. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 168 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. However, because of the relatively high consequential threshold for 
violation, it is unlikely, although not inconceivable, that cyber election meddling would qualify as 
an unlawful use of force. On the subject of cyber uses of force, see Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of 
Cyber Force and International Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1110 (Marc Weller ed. 2015). 
54  Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the 
Context of Intl Security, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. GGE 2015 
Report]. See also Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. and 
Telecomm. in the Context of Intl Security, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter 
U.N. GGE 2013 Report]. 
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on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, the product of a seven-year 
project to determine how international law applies in the cyber context.55 The IGE 
consisted of two groups of twenty international experts, and its conclusions were 
vetted by scores of peer reviewers. Nor did the premise of sovereignty as a primary 
rule encounter serious pushback from States during the Hague Process, which 
brought together fifty delegations, along with representatives from a number of 
international organizations, to consider drafts of the manual prior to publication. 
Finally, adherence to the premise that sovereignty may be violated appeared 
to be the established U.S. position, as indicated in remarks by Department of State 
Legal Adviser Harold Koh at a 2012 interagency legal conference held at U.S. 
Cyber Command: 
States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the 
sovereignty of other States, including outside the context of armed conflict. 
The physical infrastructure that supports the internet and cyber activities is 
generally located in sovereign territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the 
territorial State.56 
The position of most other countries is in accord. For instance, at the 
European launch of Tallinn Manual 2.0, Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders 
noted that we mustnt be naive. Cyber operations against institutions, political 
parties, and individuals underline why we need the international legal principles of 
sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs of other states.57 
Indications began to surface in 2016 that certain U.S. officials tasked with 
rendering legal advice concerning cyber operations had adopted a different view. 
This view was set forth most fully in an American Journal of International Law Unbound 
article by Colonel Gary Corn, the Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Cyber Command, 
and Robert Taylor, a recently retired senior attorney from the Department of 
Defenses Office of General Counsel. According to Corn and Taylor: 
Some argue that limitations imposed by the concept of sovereignty fill this 
normative spacethat sovereignty is itself a binding rule of international law 
that precludes virtually any action by one state in the territory of another that 
violates the domestic law of that other state, absent consent. However, law 
                                                 
55  There have been two editions of the book, each prepared by different IGEs. Both treat sovereignty 
as a primary rule. Compare TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE r. 1 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2013) with TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, rr. 1
4. 
56  Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. State Dept, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command Inter-
Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012). On the Koh statement, see Michael N. Schmitt, 
International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed, 54 HARV. J. INTL L. 
ONLINE 13 (2012). See also Applicability of International Law to Conflicts in Cyberspace, 2014 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, § A(3)(b), at 737.  
57  Bert Koenders, Foreign Minister, Neth., Remarks at The Hague Regarding Tallinn Manual 2.0 (Feb. 
13, 2017) (on file with author). 
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and state practice instead indicate that sovereignty serves as a principle of 
international law that guides state interactions, but is not itself a binding rule 
that dictates results under international law. While this principle of 
sovereignty, including territorial sovereignty, should factor into the conduct 
of every cyber operation, it does not establish an absolute bar against 
individual or collective state cyber operations that affect cyberinfrastructure 
within another state, provided that the effects do not rise to the level of an 
unlawful use of force or an unlawful intervention.58 
Corn and Taylors assertions are both counter-factual and counter-
normative. First, those taking the opposing view do not argue that any non-
consensual cyber operation contravening the target States domestic law also 
amounts to a violation of sovereignty. For instance, they are of the view that 
remote cyber activities that violate domestic law on espionage would not, in 
themselves, violate international law.59 Indeed, violation of a States domestic legal 
regime seldom bears on the breach of a primary rule of international law. Nor do 
those viewing sovereignty as a primary rule of law suggest that sovereignty 
constitutes an absolute bar to cyber operations conducted by other States. Instead, 
as will be explained, proponents assert that the nature of the cyber activity and its 
attendant consequences determine whether a violation of sovereignty has 
occurred. Despite such inaccuracies, it is essential to understand that by adopting 
the Corn-Taylor approach, election meddling by cyber-means would never 
amount to a violation of the target States sovereignty, for only the breach of an 
obligation contained in a primary rule of international law qualifies as an 
internationally wrongful act. 
The opposing approach was set forth in a Texas Law Review article in which 
the author and a colleague surveyed treatment of the matter by international 
tribunals, States, international organizations, and academics.60 We concluded that 
sovereignty has been treated for decades as a primary rule of international law, 
and we could identify no basis for treating the concept differently in the context 
of cyberspace.61 For us, and for the majority of States and international law 
experts, the question that presents itself is whether a remote cyber operation such 
as election meddling rises to the level of a violation of sovereignty.62 As Brian 
Eagan, then the Department of States Legal Adviser, noted during a 2017 
Berkeley Law School address: 
                                                 
58  Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AM. J. INTL L. UNBOUND 207, 
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2.0, supra note 53, at r. 32. 
60  Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1639 (2017). 
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The very design of the Internet may lead to some encroachment on other 
sovereign jurisdictions. Precisely when a nonconsensual cyber operation 
violates the sovereignty of another State is a question lawyers within the U.S. 
government continue to study carefully, and it is one that ultimately will be 
resolved through the practice and opinio juris of States.63 
The 1928 Island of Palmas arbitration sets forth the classic definition of 
sovereignty: [s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, 
to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.64 This definition 
signals the two critical aspects of sovereignty: territoriality and State functions. It 
also confirms that only States violate sovereignty, either directly, such as by virtue 
of cyber operations conducted by its organs, or by attribution of a non-State 
actors cyber operation pursuant to the law of State responsibility, an issue 
examined in further detail below. 
As noted, it is well-accepted that a States non-consensual, physical 
penetration of another States territory, or even unconsented to and adverse 
presence thereon, amounts to a violation of sovereignty. The question is when 
should a remotely conducted cyber operation by, or attributable to, one State that 
manifests on cyber infrastructure in anothers territory be treated as analogously 
running afoul of the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts struggled mightily with this issue. They built 
rough consensus around two situations. First, the experts agreed, based on the 
right of a State to control access to its territory, that a violation of sovereignty may 
result from an infringement on a States territorial integrity. In this regard, they 
generally agreed that a remotely conducted cyber operation causing physical 
damage either to the targeted cyber infrastructure (as was the case with the Stuxnet 
operation) or objects reliant thereon, or injury to persons, violates sovereignty.65 
It makes no difference whether the damaged cyber infrastructure is private or 
governmental, for the crux of the violation is the causation of consequences upon 
the States territory. 
It is unlikely that a State would engage in election meddling by causing 
physical damage to cyber infrastructure, if only because lesser means would usually 
suffice to achieve its objective. The more likely scenario is a cyber operation 
designed to induce a loss of functionality of either election systems or cyber 
infrastructure with a nexus to the election, such as the servers of a political party. 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts extended the notion of damage to loss of 
63  Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept of State, Remarks at Berkeley Law School on International 
Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/B6TH-232L. 
64  Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
65  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 20. 
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functionality on the basis that it should not matter whether targeted systems are 
physically damaged or simply rendered inoperative, for the effect is usually the 
same the system no longer works.66 As an example, the 2012 cyber operations 
against Saudi Aramco necessitated the replacement of affected computers and 
therefore, if conducted by another State as is suspected, amounted to a violation 
of sovereignty even though the systems suffered no physical damage.67 Treating 
the loss of functionality as the equivalent of physical damage comports with the 
object and purpose of the rule of sovereignty: to afford the territorial State control 
over consequential activities on its territory. 
By this teleological approach, a malicious cyber operation that causes any 
election-related cyber infrastructure on a States territory to cease to operate would 
qualify as a sovereignty violation. As an example, a foreign States operation that 
disabled the computer systems of a political action committee or media 
organization that favored one candidate would breach sovereignty. The critical 
point is not that there was a nexus between the targeted system and the election, 
but instead simply that the operation resulted in the requisite harma loss of 
functionality. 
It must be cautioned that the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts could not achieve 
consensus as to the precise meaning of loss of functionality. For some, the 
notion implies an irreversible loss of function. For others, it extends to situations 
in which physical repair, as in replacement of a hard drive, is necessary. A number 
of Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts would treat the need to replace the operating system 
or bespoke data upon which the functioning of the system relies as a loss of 
functionality.68 The author sympathizes with the latter position because the 
essence of sovereignty is control by the State over activities on its territory; remote 
cyber operations that necessitate reloading or replacement represent a significant 
intrusion on that legal prerogative. 
The most legally unsettled situations with respect to sovereignty, however, 
are those cyber operations that manifest on another States territory without 
causing physical damage or serious loss of functionality. It was difficult to identify 
majority and minority views amongst the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts on the subject. 
Even those experts willing to consider the possibility that a violation of 
sovereignty is possible in such scenarios took contrasting positions. Among the 
activities proffered by one or more of them as sovereignty violations were: 
                                                 
66  Id. at 2021. 
67  Nicole Perlroth, In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-
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68  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 21.  
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a cyber operation causing cyber infrastructure or programs to operate 
differently; altering or deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure without 
causing physical or functional consequences, as described above; emplacing 
malware into a system; installing backdoors; and causing a temporary, but 
significant, loss of functionality, as in the case of a major DDoS operation.69 
In the authors view, an operation rendering cyber infrastructure incapable 
of performing its functions in the manner intended qualifies as a sovereignty 
violation. One that causes election machinery to misreport results, for example, 
would fall into this category, as would one that renders machinery incapable of 
transmitting valid elections results. 
Interestingly, and despite disagreement over these diverse examples, each 
expert tended to justify his or her position by reference to the object and purpose 
of the principle of sovereignty that affords States the full control over access to 
and activities on their territory.70 In light of this confusing mélange of views, it is 
impossible to draw definitive red lines regarding cyber election meddling in the 
context of the territorial aspect of sovereignty, except with respect to situations 
causing physical damage or at least a significant impact on functionality. Since 
most operations are unlikely to reach this threshold, a grey zone of normative 
uncertainty looms when assessing such interference in a foreign States elections. 
It accordingly would be difficult to make the case that the Russian cyber 
operations constituted a violation of U.S. sovereignty solely on the basis that they 
manifested on U.S. territory. 
A more fertile ground for finding a violation of sovereignty vis-à-vis remote 
cyber operations affecting another States elections is interference with, or 
usurpation of, inherently governmental functions.71 Such activities, which need 
not cause damage or loss of functionality, violate sovereignty because States enjoy 
the exclusive right to perform inherently governmental activities on their territory. 
The inherently governmental function concept lacks granularity, although some 
cases are clear. On the one hand, purely commercial activities, even if engaged in 
by State-owned enterprises, do not qualify, for they obviously are not within the 
exclusive purview of a State. On the other hand, law enforcement and defense of 
the State from external attack are inherently governmental in character. 
Between these extremes lies a great deal of uncertainty. Fortunately, for our 
purposes, a paradigmatic example of an inherently governmental function is the 
holding of elections. This being so, the issue is whether cyber activities qualify as 
interference or usurpation by virtue of their effect on an election. Interference 
denotes activities that disturb the territorial States ability to perform the functions 
as it wishes. By contrast, usurpation involves performing an inherently 
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governmental function on another States territory without its consent. In both 
examples, an external actor is disrupting the ability of the target State to perform 
its governmental functions. 
While the usurpation criterion has little relevance in the election meddling 
context, cyber operations may well be employed to interfere with another States 
elections. Certain operations would plainly qualify, as in the case of a cyber 
operation that altered election data or a temporary distributed denial of service 
attack against election machinery that rendered it impossible for voters in a 
particular district to cast their votes. In States with online voting, the implantation 
of malware in private computers that blocks voting likewise would constitute 
interference, as would using cyber operations to alter voter registration numbers. 
It is equally clear that merely engaging in election propaganda does not 
amount to interference, at least as a matter of law. This conclusion is supported 
by the extensive State practice of engaging in both truthful and untruthful 
propaganda during foreign elections. Of course, such activities may be 
condemned, as the efforts of RT and Sputnik and the purchase of advertising on 
social media were in the ODNI Report,72 but such condemnation is seldom based 
on assertions of a breach of international law, specifically the obligation to respect 
sovereignty. This paucity of opinio juris and surfeit of contrary practice 
corroborates the conclusion that election propaganda by cyber-means does not 
violate a target States sovereignty.73 
Other Russian activities likewise failed to reach the level of interference. 
Although the financial sums spent by Russia and its supporters in attempting to 
influence the U.S. elections were large, international law imposes no monetary 
threshold at which the financing of election activities in another State constitutes 
interference, even though as a practical matter foreign financing can determine 
the outcome of an election. The penetration by Russian hackers of local boards 
of election similarly failed to qualify as interference, for there was no subsequent 
activity that exploited the access to affect the elections. As such, interference did 
not occur. Moreover, even though Russian operations encouraged protests and 
rallies, these acts do not qualify as interference because, so long as they are 
peaceful, they are a regular feature in many democratic elections. 
Russian operators succeeded by avoiding both ends of this legal spectrum 
and instead operated adroitly in the legal grey zone lying between them. Consider 
the messaging conducted by Russian trolls. The difference between their activities 
and those of a State or State-supportive media outlet that conducts an open 
propaganda campaign, even one involving disinformation, is the ability of the 
electorate to consider the source of the information. Indeed, recall that in order 
to enhance their efforts, the trolls created fake identities in which they 
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masqueraded as Americans, sometimes even impersonating actual Americans. 
Thus, in addition to conveying a message to the electorate, the trolls sought to 
bolster that message by feigning the source thereof. Arguably, this manipulation 
of voters ability to assess the messages in coming to their own decision tipped 
the scales and therefore constituted unlawful interference. 
Another Russian activity within this grey zone was the hacking into various 
servers containing, inter alia, email traffic. As noted, the mere fact that the systems 
were penetrated does not suffice to qualify the hacking as interference with the 
election any more than espionage involving government systems is unlawful. In 
certain cases, however, the operations involved exfiltration of data and its 
weaponization through release at critical points in the election.74 An assertion 
that the exfiltration and subsequent release were materially more aggravated than 
mere propaganda or disinformation, such that the operations qualified as 
interference, is at least somewhat supportable. 
Note, in this regard, that whether the operations successfully swayed the 
election has no bearing on their lawfulness, as the essence of a sovereignty 
violation is the fact of interference. That said, there must be a degree of 
interference even if it does not achieve its desired objective. For example, a cyber 
operation that attempts to alter election returns, but which is foiled by effective 
point defenses in the targeted system, lacks the element of interference.75 
Taken together, the most legally sustainable and persuasive position is that 
aspects of the Russian influence campaign violated U.S. sovereignty.76 Yet, this 
conclusion is far from unassailable. As noted above, an argument, albeit not widely 
held, holds that sovereignty may never be violated because it is not a primary rule 
of international law. Moreover, even if sovereignty serves as a primary rule, there 
was no damage or substantial loss of functionality to any cyber infrastructure 
related to the U.S. election. Likewise, the Russian operations cleverly avoided 
actions, such as creating flawed returns, that would unmistakably amount to 
interference by taking on an inherently governmental function. Although the 
influence campaign was condemnable, it must be acknowledged that Russia 
conducted its operations in the grey zone of the law of sovereignty, thereby 
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complicating potential U.S. responses and avoiding the international communitys 
opprobrium for violating international law. 
B. Intervention 
The other breach of an international law obligation most likely to be 
committed through election meddling is unlawful intervention into the internal 
affairs of another State.77 Sovereignty is the foundational principle from which this 
primary rule of customary law derives.78 As noted by Lassa Oppenheim, the 
obligation not to intervene is the corollary of every States right to sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence.79 Accordingly, States must respect 
the right of other States to exercise control over certain activities occurring on 
their territory. Note that like the violation of sovereignty, only States can engage 
in unlawful intervention, either directly through the actions of their organs or 
indirectly through instructions to, or control over, non-State actors such as IT 
companies, hacker groups, or terrorist organizations. And, as with sovereignty 
violations, cyber operations targeting both private and government infrastructure 
can qualify as intervention.80 
Two elements must be satisfied before a cyber operation qualifies as 
wrongful intervention. The operation must affect a States domaine réservé and it 
must be coercive.81 Absent one of these elements, the operation may constitute 
interference, but it will not rise to the level of unlawful intervention. 
With respect to the first element, the difference between an inherently 
governmental function in the context of sovereignty and the domaine réservé is 
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subtle; the two categories often overlap. The former denotes an activity reserved 
for the government alone, while the latter refers to one that has not been 
committed to international law by either treaty or customary law. In its Nicaragua 
judgment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained that a prohibited 
intervention must . . . be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted 
by the principle of sovereignty, to decide freely.82 The Court went on to highlight 
the choice of a political . . . system as a clear-cut example of a domaine réservé.83 
The conduct of elections is both an inherently governmental act and within 
the States domaine réservé. Some limited carve-outs of this domaine réservé exist, 
principally with respect to human rights norms such as self-determination, a topic 
briefly mentioned below. But, as a general matter, the process by which a State 
selects its officials is left to the determination of that State and is broadly 
unregulated by international law. Accordingly, cyber activities by foreign States 
that affect either the process by which elections are conducted or their outcome 
qualify as prohibited intervention, so long as the second prong of the intervention 
test, coercion, is satisfied.84 
In the election context, the determinative factor distinguishing external 
influence on an election (which may be unlawful in the context of a sovereignty 
violation involving an inherently governmental function) from prohibited 
intervention is the element of coercion. Referring to the right of a State to choose 
its own political system, the ICJ observed in Nicaragua, Intervention is wrongful 
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain 
free ones.85 According to the Court, the element of coercion . . . defines, and 
indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.86 
The question is therefore what type of election meddling can be said to be 
coercive. Although international law provides no conclusive definition of the 
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term, the Declaration on Friendly Relations provides that [n]o State may use or 
encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce 
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.87 Drawing on this 
text, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that coercion refers to an affirmative 
act designed to deprive another State of its freedom of choice, that is, to force 
that State to act in an involuntary manner or involuntarily refrain from acting in a 
particular way.88 
Some election meddling certainly would reach this threshold. As Brian Egan 
noted while serving as Department of State Legal Adviser, a cyber operation by 
a State that interferes with another countrys ability to hold an election or that 
manipulates another countrys election results would be a clear violation of the 
rule of non-intervention.89 Blocking voting by cyber means, such as by disabling 
election machinery or by conducting a distributed denial of service attack, would 
likewise be coercive. In both of these situations, the result of the election, which 
is the expression of the freedom of choice of the electorate, is being manipulated 
against the will of the electorate. 
At the other end of the spectrum are cyber operations designed to influence 
decisions in the target State without reaching the threshold of coercion. As 
explained in the Tallinn Manual 2.0: 
[C]oercion must be distinguished from persuasion, criticism, public 
diplomacy, propaganda, retribution, mere maliciousness, and the like in the 
sense that, unlike coercion, such activities merely involve either influencing 
(as distinct from factually compelling) the voluntary actions of the target State 
or seek no action on the part of the target State at all.90 
Therefore, those actions described as lawful in the context of sovereignty 
violations, like espionage, slanted media reporting by Russian controlled media, 
and the purchase of advertising to sway the electorate in favor of a particular 
candidate, are similarly not coercive and do not qualify as a prohibited 
intervention. 
As with sovereignty violations, a significant grey zone of normative 
uncertainty exists between the two ends of the influence-intervention continuum. 
Again, the Russian cyber meddling exploited this grey zone, thereby frustrating 
the ability of U.S. officials to characterize it as unlawful and thereby have the 
grounds for fashioning a robust response. The two best prospects for qualifying 
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Russian operations as intervention were the cyber activities that feigned American 
citizenship and the hacking and subsequent release of private data. 
At its core, a coercive action is intended to cause the State to do something, 
such as take a decision that it would otherwise not take, or not to engage in an 
activity in which it would otherwise engage. Thus, coercion can be said to 
subordinate the sovereign will of the target State.91 In the case of elections, this 
might manifest in the election of a candidate who otherwise would not win, the 
weakening of a successful candidates political base, or the strengthening of an 
unsuccessful candidates base in anticipation of future elections. 
Arguably, the covert nature of the troll operation deprived the American 
electorate of its freedom of choice by creating a situation in which it could not 
fairly evaluate the information it was being provided. As the voters were unaware 
that they were being manipulated by a foreign power, their decision making, and 
thus their ability to control their governance, was weakened and distorted. The 
deceptive nature of the trolling is what distinguishes it from a mere influence 
operation. And it can be argued that the hacking and release tainted the electoral 
process by introducing information that, albeit genuine, was acquired by means 
that are expressly prohibited under U.S. domestic law, as well as the law of most 
other Statesnamely, the unlawful penetration and exfiltration of private data.92 
In this sense, the electorates freedom of choice was being thwarted. 
These conclusions are by no means unassailable. In particular, it remains 
unresolved whether coercion requires a direct causal nexus between the act in 
question and the coercive effect, as in the case of changing election results.93 A 
number of Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts took this position.94 However, a majority of 
them, including the author, was of the view that indirect causation of coercive 
effect suffices.95 This is an essential distinction because both of the 
aforementioned Russian activities were indirect in the sense that, while they may 
have affected the voters choice of candidates, or even their decision to vote at all, 
the operations did not in themselves alter the result. Because indirect causation 
moves the activity along the continuum in the direction of interference and away 
from intervention, to survive as intervention it is critical to highlight the centrality 
                                                 
91  Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 86, at 381. 
92  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2016). 
93  In this regard, it must be cautioned that intervention may be direct or indirect, as in the case of 
financing insurgents. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., supra note 77, at ¶¶ 205, 228; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
supra note 77, at ¶ 3; G.A. Res. 36/103, annex, supra note 84, at pmbl. The issue being examined 
here, however, is whether the effect that qualifies as coercive (for example, a change in election 
results) must be directly caused by the cyber meddling. 
94  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 320. 
95  Id. 
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of the covert nature of the Russian operations and the extent to which they 
distorted the accepted U.S. electoral dynamic. 
If indirect causation satisfies the causal facet of coercion, the fact that 
intervention need not be directed against governmental election infrastructure is 
of particular importance, for it means that cyber operations directed against a 
political party could qualify. An example would be a denial of service attack against 
the partys website, blog, email or other forms of online campaigning at a critical 
juncture in the election.96 A cyber operation that generated false messages 
purportedly from the party and attempted to sway votes or alter the partys actual 
messaging in a significant way also would qualify. 
President Trump has repeatedly suggested that any election meddling that 
might have occurred did not affect the outcome. However, whether this is true as 
a matter of fact is irrelevant as a matter of law. The internationally wrongful act 
of prohibited intervention does not require that the cyber operations in question 
be successful. It only requires that they be intended to have a coercive effect with 
respect to a domaine réservé, in this case elections. 
As should be apparent, the prohibition of intervention in the context of 
election meddling, like the violation of sovereignty, is characterized by substantial 
uncertainty.97 Fortunately, there is no disagreement over whether the prohibition 
comprises a primary rule of international law. But, while there are clear-cut cases 
that either do or do not breach the meddling States obligations vis-à-vis 
96  For an innovative, albeit somewhat overbroad, call for application of the principle of non-
intervention to DDoS attacks, see William Mattessich, Note, Digital Destruction: Applying the Principle 
of Non-Intervention to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Manifesting No Physical Damage, 54 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 873 (2016). 
97  This uncertainty was acknowledged during a 2017 workshop of the European Leadership Network 
tasked with assessing key concepts and norms in Russia-West relations: 
A destabilising factor affecting relations between Russia and the West have been 
the accusations over suspected interference in elections, both the US elections 
last year and the Russian elections in 2011. While the text of the non-
intervention principle makes no explicit reference to elections, its remit covers 
direct and indirect activities that breach national and political independence, 
challenge political stability or change political systems. 
Events of the past year and a half highlight the incomplete nature of these 
prohibitions. The conduct of political campaigns, their direct and indirect 
support by foreign nationals, external governments, and the funding of parties 
and lobby groups by foreign states highlight the weakness of the Helsinki sixth 
principle. In addition, the marketisation of politics including through sponsored 
political advertisements and private fundraising enterprises has circumvented 
the non-intervention restrictions. The outcome of an electoral process directly 
affects a states political independence and stability, yet the modern-day conduct 
of elections is not adequately safeguarded against the involvement of foreign 
actors, and the international normative framework remains incomplete. 
 DENITSA RAYNOVA, TOWARDS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE NON-INTERVENTION
PRINCIPLE: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK POST-WORKSHOP REPORT 1, 6 (Oct. 2017). 
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intervention, a significant grey zone lies between the easy cases, particularly with 
respect to indirect coercion.98 This grey zone creates legal uncertainly and affords 
States fertile ground in which to meddle in each others political activities. 
C. Due Diligence 
In some cases, a lack of sufficient evidence will preclude officials from 
concluding that another State conducted cyber election meddling, or that the 
operations were otherwise attributable to it, as discussed below. However, if it can 
be established that they were mounted from the territory of a particular State, the 
possibility that the territorial State may be in breach of its due diligence obligation 
arises.99 
The principle of due diligence obligates States to ensure that their territory 
is not used as a location from which cyber operations having serious adverse 
consequences for the target State are launched.100 The ICJ acknowledged the 
principle of due diligence and the legal obligation it creates in its first case, Corfu 
Channel.101 In the judgment, the court observed that it is every States obligation 
not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other states.102 Judge John Basset Moore of the Permanent Court of Justice had 
earlier recognized the duty in the celebrated Lotus case, where, writing in dissent, 
he stated, It is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent 
the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its 
people.103 
During consultations regarding drafts of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, some States 
expressed a tentative view that despite the notable lineage of the rule, it was of a 
lex ferenda character.104 Indeed, when the issue of due diligence arose during U.N. 
GGE deliberations regarding its 2013 and 2015 reports, all that could be agreed 
                                                 
98  For an argument that the Russian operations qualify as coercive intervention on the basis of the 
nature of state interests, see Steven J. Barela, Zero Shades of Grey: Russian-Ops Violate International 
Law, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/85QN-UUQC. The author finds Barelas 
suggestion interesting, but unreflective of lex lata. 
99  See generally Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J.F. 68 (2015). 
100  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 6. For an excellent survey of the obligation of due 
diligence, see INTL L. ASSN, STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIRST 
REPORT (Mar. 7, 2014). 
101  U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J., supra note 77.  
102  Id. at 22; see also Neth. V. U.S., 2 R.I.A.A., supra note 64, at 839 (Territorial sovereignty . . . involves 
the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation 
to protect within the territory the rights of other States.). 
103  S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7) (separate opinion 
by Moore, J.). 
104  The author served as Director of the project and was present at all meetings. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 54 Vol. 19 No. 1 
upon was a hortatory statement to the effect that States should take actions that 
are necessary to put an end to harmful cyber operations occurring from their 
territory.105 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts carefully considered this matter, particularly 
since the principle had been applied principally in the context of transboundary 
environmental harm.106 Although they agreed that the principle was a primary rule 
of international law applicable in cyberspace, they framed a number of strict 
limitations on its application. First, the due diligence obligation is one of conduct, 
not result. Thus, so long as a State is taking all feasible measures to put an end to 
the harmful cyber operations, it is in compliance with the obligation.107 Second, a 
majority of the experts took the position that the obligation only requires a State 
to take action in the face of ongoing harmful cyber activities, or ones in which a 
material step has been taken towards execution.108 It imposes no preventative duty 
to take measures to preclude future deleterious cyber activities from its territory 
or to monitor its cyberspace for ongoing ones.109 Third, borrowing from 
international environmental law, the experts agreed that the obligation only 
attaches when the consequences for the victim State are serious.110 Relatedly, 
they concluded the cyber activity in question must be contrary to the rights of 
the target State in the sense that if it had been conducted by, or was attributable 
to, another State, the operation would have qualified as an internationally 
wrongful act.111 
Despite these limitations, the principle of due diligence nevertheless acts to 
relieve a target State of having to attribute election meddling to another State in 
order to claim that it is the victim of an internationally wrongful act. So long as 
the former can establish that the cyber operations would breach a legal obligation 
had they been attributable to a State, for instance by violating sovereignty or 
qualifying as a prohibited intervention, the State from whose territory the 
                                                 
105  U.N. GGE 2013 Report, supra note 54, ¶ 23; U.N. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 54, ¶ 13(c). 
106  See, for example, Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941); U.N. Conference on the 
Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, prin. 21, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, prin. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
107  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 47. 
108  Id. at 4344. 
109  Id.  
110  Id. at 34 (drawing from the Trail Smelter Case, supra note 106, at 1965); see also Intl Law Commn, 
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities, art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 6 of commentary, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 
[2001] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (using the 
terms significant and substantial). 
111  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 34. 
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operations are being launched shoulders a legal duty to take feasible measures to 
put an end to the operation. The cyber operations must have serious adverse 
consequences, but interfering with another States national elections will usually 
reach that threshold. 
In the Russian meddling situation, it may be, as explained below, difficult to 
attribute the action of non-State actors, especially the Internet Research Agency, 
to Russia, a necessary step in finding Russia legally responsible for their actions. 
However, so long as Russia was aware of the troll farms operations, it is 
responsible for failing to put an end to these operations, at least to the extent they 
would have violated international law had they been committed by organs of the 
Russian State, such as its intelligence agencies. While it is hard to imagine that the 
Russian authorities were unaware of the trolling, it is difficult to say with great 
confidence that the operations were unlawful. Again, Russia identified and 
exploited a grey zone of legal uncertainty. 
D. Other Breaches of International Law
Some scholars have raised other possibilities for how Russian election
meddling may have breached international law. Particularly creative is Professor 
Jens Ohlins assertion that it may have implicated self-determination, which grants 
a people the right to determine their political arrangements (at a systemic level) 
and their future destiny (at a more granular level of policy).112 Recognized in the 
first article of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the right of self-determination is generally recognized as customary 
international law.113 The identical articles provide that by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status. 
However, as Ohlin himself notes, there are numerous reasons why 
international lawyers might hesitate to take this position. They include the fact 
that arguments based on self-determination typically appear when groups are 
trying to create a State, perhaps through succession, and that the will of the 
people cannot be determined with any degree of certainty before an election.114 
But the best response against application is that self-determination is simply not 
112  Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 1579, 1580 (2017).
113  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 77, at ¶ 5; East Timor 
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 28 (June 30) (finding self-determination to have an erga omnes 
character). 
114  Ohlin, supra note 112, at 159697. 
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meant to apply to a situation where the people are all citizens of a State rather 
than a distinct group therein that is denied the right to govern itself, as in the case 
of colonialism, apartheid, alien subjugation, and perhaps occupation. 
Somewhat more promising is Ohlins examination of the possibility that the 
Russian operations may have violated the right to privacy under international 
human rights law. The right to privacy is secured by Article 17 of the ICCPR, 
which provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honor and reputation.115 Russia is also a party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(1) of which states that [e]veryone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.116 The right is generally considered to be customary in nature 
and applicable to cyber correspondence, such as e-mail.117 
Ohlin highlights a series of obstacles to a finding that the Russian operations 
violated the human rights of affected individuals. He notes, for instance, that 
human rights were originally conceived as applicable to a States own citizens and 
points to the extensive practice of espionage that States have not characterized as 
a violation of the right to privacy.118 The most significant obstacle, however, is the 
open question of whether international human rights obligations are 
extraterritorial in nature, an issue directly on point with respect to cyber operations 
mounted remotely from outside a States territory. As Ohlin observes,119 there has 
been significant disagreement within the U.S. government over the extraterritorial 
applicability of the ICCPR.120 
The broader question is the extraterritorial applicability of human rights 
obligations generally, including customary law rights such as that requiring respect 
                                                 
115  ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 17. 
116  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
117  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 189. This conclusion is based in part on the fact that the 
right is found in Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
118  Ohlin, supra note 112, at 158485. 
119  Id. at 158587. 
120  In particular, the U.S. has long taken the position that the ICCPR obligations do not apply 
extraterritorially. See, for example, U.N. Hum. Rts. Commn, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 469, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 
2005). Interestingly, the State Departments Legal Adviser issued a 2010 memo to the effect this 
position was incorrect as a matter of law. U.S. Dept of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, 
Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2010). That memo did not mature into the U.S. position. 
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for the right of privacy.121 Although the prevailing view is that treaty law (absent a 
provision to the contrary) and customary human rights law apply extraterritorially, 
such obligations attach only when the State exercises power or effective control 
either over the foreign territory on which the individual owed the obligation is 
located or over the individual concerned.122 Occupation of enemy territory 
exemplifies the former, whereas detention of the individual abroad illustrates the 
latter. 
In the case of remote cyber operations, the State enjoys neither. An 
argument nevertheless can be made that a State conducting a remote cyber 
operation can sometimes control the exercise or enjoyment of a human right.123 
In the Russian cyber operations, for instance, remote non-consensual intrusion 
into databases containing personal data and the subsequent release of that data 
arguably deprived the individuals affected of the enjoyment of their right to 
privacy. Although this is an appealing argument, it is thus far unsupported by 
either State practice or expressions of opinio juris. The approach might amount to 
laudable lex ferenda, but it is not lex lata. 
Finally, any assertion that the activities underlying the election meddling 
were unlawful under international law because they constituted espionage can be 
quickly discarded. Cyber espionage is an act undertaken clandestinely or under 
false pretenses that uses cyber capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather, 
information, whether that information be private or governmental in nature.124 
The GRUs cyber activities in the Russian case, such as the exfiltration of email 
traffic, clearly constituted espionage. Similarly, collection operations targeting 
U.S. primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups [that were] viewed as 
likely to shape future U.S. policies qualify as espionage.125 
Espionage, per se, does not violate of international law.126 Thus, the mere fact 
that Russian intelligence agencies were conducting cyber espionage involving the 
U.S. elections did not render them unlawful. That is not to say that an espionage 
operation never violates international law, as the means by which the information 
                                                 
121  For comprehensive treatment of the subject, see MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY ch. IV (2011). 
122  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 18384. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts drew the term 
power or effective control from Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004). With regard to European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence in this context, see Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶¶ 130
39; Catan v. Moldova & Russia, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, ¶ 105.  
123  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 185. 
124  Id. at 168. 
125  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
126  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 32. 
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is gathered may amount to an internationally wrongful act. For instance, if a 
government aircraft flying in the national airspace of the target country conducts 
cyber operations designed to access election-related cyber infrastructure, doing so 
arguably violates the States sovereignty by virtue of the unconsented-to presence 
of the aircraft. 
IV. ATTRIBUTION 
In a press statement made in the twilight of his presidency, President 
Obama suggested that Russias data theft and subsequent disclosure were of a 
nature that the highest levels of the Russian government must have ordered 
them.127 The intelligence community likewise concluded that Putin ordered an 
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election.128 Specifically, 
it found that the effort consisted of covert and overt activities by Russian 
government agencies, State-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid 
social media users or trolls.129 
Predictably, Russia demanded that the U.S. provide the evidence to support 
these allegations.130 Although the indictment brought by Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller does contain an account of some alleged Russian activities, a granular U.S. 
reply is unlikely, in great part because providing this evidence would reveal 
sensitive cyber capabilities.131 Moreover, there is no obligation under international 
law for one State accusing another State of unfriendlyor even unlawful
conduct to reveal the information on which it bases these accusations.132 
Still, the U.S. governments naming of Russia as the actor behind the 
influence campaign does raise the issue of the attribution. Recall that an act or 
omission only qualifies as an internationally wrongful act if it both breaches an 
obligation under international law and is attributable to a State. In this regard, 
factual attribution must be distinguished from legal attribution. The former refers 
to the level of certainty that a cyber operation was conducted by a particular 
individual, group, organization, or State. As a general matter, factual attribution 
                                                 
127  Obama Press Release, supra note 1. 
128  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at ii. 
129  Id. at 2. 
130  Putin Tells U.S. to Send Evidence of Vote Meddling, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/N2AY-
G56Y. 
131  See, for example, David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony 
Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/WY9C-J45T (explaining U.S. 
unwillingness to reveal the way it was able to attribute the 2014 Sony hack to North Korea).  
132  This was the conclusion of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 83. 
Although there is no legal obligation to do so, the U.N. GGE has encouraged States to provide 
such evidence when cyber operations are at issue. U.N. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 54, at ¶ 15. 
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under international law is subject to a reasonableness standard.133 With the notable 
exception of attribution for the purpose of taking countermeasures,134 
international law generally does not require States to be correct in their 
determinations; rather, they must be reasonable when making them. 
Legal attribution, by contrast, deals with the conditions precedent to a 
finding that a State is responsible for a cyber operation pursuant to the secondary 
rules of international law set forth in the law of State responsibility. The 
International Law Commission has authoritatively restated this body of law in its 
Articles on State Responsibility.135 Legal attribution plays an essential role in 
ascertaining the lawfulness of cyber meddling because a finding that cyber election 
meddling constituted an internationally wrongful act requires both that the cyber 
operations involved have breached an obligation owed by the meddling State (the 
responsible State in the law of State responsibility) to the target State (the 
injured State) and that the operations were attributable to the former as a legal 
matter. 
The most straightforward form of attribution is on the basis that an organ 
of the State, like the GRU or other intelligence agency, conducted the cyber 
operation in question.136 Such operations are attributable to the State even when 
they are ultra vires, that is, beyond the assigned responsibility of the organ.137 As an 
example, if the activities of the Russian intelligence agencies with respect to the 
U.S. elections were unauthorized, Russia would nevertheless bear responsibility 
under international law. The key is whether the organ is acting in an apparently 
official capacity or a purely private one.138 Engaging in private criminal activity for 
personal gain would be an example of the latter. 
To qualify as an organ of the State, the entity must either enjoy that status 
under the States domestic laws or factually act as an instrument of, and in 
                                                 
133  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 8182. Fact-finding bodies like tribunals, arbitral panels, 
domestic courts and the like must abide by the standards and burdens of proof applicable in 
proceedings before them. These may differ, as in the case of criminal trials imposing a higher 
standard of proof than applicable in civil proceedings. 
134  Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
supra note 8, ¶ 3 of commentary to art. 49; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 116. A State that 
misattributes a cyber operation upon which a countermeasure is based commits an internationally 
wrongful act. 
135  Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
supra note 8.  
136  Id., art. 4(1); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 15.  
137  And even in the face of contrary direction from superiors. See Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8, at ¶ 13 of commentary to 
art. 4.  
138  Id. 
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complete dependence on, the State.139 The inclusion of de facto organs precludes a 
State from escaping responsibility for a breach of its international obligations by 
simply failing to designate as such an entity that is acting as an organ of the State. 
For instance, by setting up an extra-legal cyber intelligence organization that 
operates entirely for State purposes and at its direction, a State does not evade 
legal responsibility for its operations.140 
By these standards, Russia is responsible for any aspect of the cyber election 
meddling conducted by its intelligence agencies that amounted to a violation of 
an international law prohibition, as arguably was the case vis-à-vis the hacking and 
release operation. However, the activities of State-owned entities present a more 
complicated situation. The fact that an entity is State-owned does not suffice in 
itself for attribution of its activities to the State.141 Rather, it must be determined 
whether the entity, despite being owned by the State, engages in undertakings that 
are solely private in nature, such as commerce. If so, its actions are not attributable 
to the State simply on the basis that it is an organ of the State. 
Particularly problematic is the case of State-owned media, for the media 
sometimes serve governmental purposes like conveying government information 
to the public or serving as a surrogate of the State internationally in public 
diplomacy, propaganda, or disinformation activities. Yet, State-owned media may 
also, despite government ownership, act independently, much like a private media 
company. In terms of attribution, the key is whether the State was using its 
ownership interest in or control of a corporation specifically in order to achieve a 
particular result.142 According to the ODNI Report, this was the case with respect 
to RT and Sputnik because they contributed to the digital part of the influence 
campaign.143 However, even if the actions of these and other Russian media might 
                                                 
139  Id. at ¶ 11 of commentary to art. 4; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 
I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶¶ 39293 (Feb. 26). 
140  Person or entities that do not qualify as de jure or de facto State organs may nevertheless be 
empowered under domestic law to exercise elements of governmental authority. If so, their 
activities, including those that are ultra vires, are attributable to the State. Intl Law Commn, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8, art. 5; TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 15. Because of the requirement for authorization under law and 
the limitation to activities that are by nature elements of government authority, attribution on this 
basis is unlikely in the case of cyber election meddling. A possible exception would be a secret 
contract to engage in offensive cyber operations during foreign elections. 
141  Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
supra note 8, at ¶ 6 of commentary to art. 8. 
142  Id. at ¶ 6 of commentary to art. 8 (citing Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (1986); American Bell International Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 170 (1986)). 
143  ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
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be attributable to the State, it is difficult to style their activities as a breach of any 
obligation Russia owed the U.S. 
As illustrated in the case of U.S. election meddling, the relevant cyber 
operations may be conducted by actors other than organs of the State, as with the 
Internet Research Agencys troll farm. Because the nexus to the State is more 
attenuated in these situations, the threshold for attribution is more demanding 
than that applicable to organs of the State. For instance, the State is not 
responsible for ultra vires activities of the non-State actors like private companies, 
patriotic hacker groups, or hacktivists.144 
The key normative hurdle to attribution, however, is that the State is only 
responsible for the cyber operations of a non-State actor when the actions taken 
are pursuant to the instructions of, or under the direction or control of the 
State,145 or when the State acknowledges and adopts the operations as its own post 
factum.146 The likelihood that a State might acknowledge and adopt a non-State 
actors cyber meddling in another States elections is slim. Therefore, the crux of 
the matter is the meaning of the terms instructions, direction, and control. 
Both the International Law Commission and legal scholars have struggled to 
describe the difference between the three terms with meaningful granularity.147 
Their failure has signaled a definitional grey zone no less dense than those 
described earlier in the context of breaches of obligations, and no less susceptible 
to leveraging by a State wishing to meddle in foreign elections. 
The International Law Commissions commentary to the Articles on State 
Responsibility suggests that instruction denotes a situation in which the non-
State actor functions as the States auxiliary.148 Restated, a State instructs a non-
State actor when it directs the non-State actor to perform a particular cyber 
operation, including election meddling, on its behalf. There is no requirement that 
                                                 
144  Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
supra note 8, at ¶¶ 78 of commentary to art. 8. 
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146  Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
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the non-State actor be compensated for the activity involved, although the 
possibility is not excluded. For instance, a hacker group could execute a cyber 
operation on the instructions of a State intelligence agency solely out of patriotism. 
Likewise, a criminal organization could carry out the same operation solely for 
financial gain. So long as the State told the group to conduct it, motivation is 
irrelevant. 
Although the International Law Commissions commentary suggests that 
the terms direction and control are to be understood in the disjunctive,149 it 
goes on to treat them ensemble as effective control,150 a standard articulated by 
the ICJ in Nicaragua151 and subsequently confirmed in its Genocide judgment.152 In 
the latter case, the Court explained: 
[I]t is not necessary to show that the persons who performed the acts alleged 
to have violated international law were in general in a relationship of 
complete dependence on the respondent State; it has to be proved that they 
acted in accordance with that States instructions or under its effective 
control. It must however be shown that this effective control was 
exercised, or that the States instructions were given, in respect of each 
operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of 
the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having 
committed the violations.153 
Perhaps the best way to think of effective control in the context of 
attribution for cyber election meddling is a de facto ability on the part of the State 
to cause the non-State group in question to launch a cyber operation that it would 
otherwise not launch or to refrain from one in which it desires to engage. It need 
not instruct the group to engage in a particular operation, but the relationship 
between the State and the group must be such that the State can, if it wishes, 
compel the non-State group to desist in the operation or alter the conduct thereof. 
Unfortunately, the effective control test raises as many questions as it 
answers. For instance, with what degree of granularity must the State be aware of 
the operation in question to exercise effective control over it? And by what means 
may effective control be established? If a State provides all of the funding that 
makes the groups cyber operations possible, but the group develops its own 
operational design, is sufficient control in place to attribute the groups cyber 
activities to the State? 
By outsourcing aspects of its interference campaign to private entities and 
individuals, Russia again found a grey zone of international law that allowed it safe 
haven to carry out its activities, for it is much more difficult to ascertain legal 
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attribution in such cases than in those situations involving the States organs. The 
U.S. intelligence community may have felt comfortable in attributing the 
operations of the Intelligence Research Agency and other non-State actors to 
Russia, but in doing so it was not applying the strict legal tests set forth in the law 
of State responsibility. Indeed, based on the information contained in their 2017 
report and other open source material, it is difficult to conclusively attribute these 
actions to Russia as a matter of law, although it would seem self-evident that those 
actions were carried out as a matter of fact in support of Russian governmental 
objectives. The best that can be said is that it might be reasonable to attribute 
them to Russia. 
V. RESPONSES 
Responding to the Russian cyber operations, and as the Trump inauguration 
loomed, the Obama Administration imposed sanctions on the GRU and Federal 
Security Service (FSB), four GRU intelligence officers, and three companies that 
had supported the GRUs operations. The Secretary of the Treasury designated 
two Russians as having used cyber-enabled means to cause misappropriation of 
funds and personal identifying information, while the Department of State 
shuttered two Russian compounds used for intelligence purposes and declared 
thirty-five Russian intelligence operatives persona non grata.154 
In March 2018, the Trump Administration finally announced sanctions on 
Russia after much foot-dragging following the passage of sanctions legislation in 
July 2017.155 This was the first time that the administration had officially 
acknowledged Russias involvement in the operations. Of particular note were 
sanctions on the Internet Research Agency, as well as Russians indicted by Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller. The FSB and GRU were also sanctioned.156 Further 
sanctions, also tied to the legislation, were announced the following month.157 
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Under international law, there are four categories of responses available to 
States facing hostile cyber operations.158 The measures taken by the Obama and 
Trump Administrations fall into the category of retorsion. An act of retorsion 
is an unfriendly, but not otherwise unlawful measure,159 with sanctions and 
expulsion of diplomatic personnel being the most emblematic and frequent.160 The 
cyber operations to which an act of retorsion responds need not constitute an 
internationally wrongful act, although they may. That both administrations limited 
their responses to retorsion suggests that they were hesitant to characterize the 
Russian operations as breaches of international law attributable to Russia. If this 
was the case, the Russian tactic of operating within the grey zone proved partially 
successful. 
If the cyber operation to which the target State wishes to respond qualifies 
as an internationally wrongful act, countermeasures may be taken. 
Countermeasures are measures that would be unlawful, either as a breach of treaty 
law or of customary international law, but for the fact that they are a response to 
another States internationally wrongful act.161 They must be proportionate to the 
internationally wrongful act, and, within the cyber context, be designed to cause 
the other State to desist in its ongoing unlawful cyber operations or to provide 
assurances, guarantees, or reparations.162 The classic example is an active defense 
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cyber operation, typically a hack back designed to end a malicious cyber 
operation launched by another State.163 
Although there are numerous other limitations on the taking of 
countermeasures, the option allows for flexibility in two regards. First, 
countermeasures need not be directed at the entity that launched the initial 
unlawful cyber operation.164 As an example, unlawful cyber election meddling 
could be addressed by conducting hack backs against government ministries, or 
even private cyber infrastructure, so long as the purpose of doing so is to apply 
pressure to end the meddling; retaliation or punishment are not permissible 
purposes. Second, countermeasures need not be in kind.165 Thus, cyber election 
meddling could be addressed by engaging in non-cyber measures that would 
otherwise be unlawful, such as imposing trade sanctions that are contrary to a 
treaty between the two States.166 
A third response is based upon the plea of necessity. States may engage in 
cyber or non-cyber activities that would otherwise be unlawful when their 
essential interests face grave and imminent peril and taking the responsive 
measures is the only way to defend the interest.167 In such cases, there is no 
requirement that the situation to which the response is taken either constitutes a 
breach of a legal obligation or be attributable to a State. This dispenses with much 
of the grey zone discussed earlier. In the Russian case, for example, the U.S. would 
not have needed to conclude that the influence campaign violated any primary 
rule of international law or establish that the nexus between the Russian 
government and those conducting the operations satisfies the attribution tests set 
out in the law of State responsibility. 
However, those grey zone issues are replaced by others resident in the plea 
of necessity. The determinative issue is whether the integrity of the election system 
amounts to an essential interest of the State. Although it is reasonable to hold that 
the fair and credible election of high-level government officials, especially the 
President, is an essential interest of the State, whereas the election of local officials 
might not be, the threshold of essentiality is indistinct. Moreover, the situation 
must be ongoing or imminent and the threat posed must be extremely serious. 
Minor cyber election meddling, even in national elections, would not merit a 
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response based on the plea, while meddling that threatened the outcome of an 
election might be characterized as grave. Determining when the peril posed by 
cyber election meddling in other cases qualifies as grave is more challenging. 
The final response option is the use of cyber or non-cyber force in self-
defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international 
law. The textual condition precedent for self-defense is an armed attack.168 
Unfortunately, the threshold at which a cyber operation qualifies as an armed 
attack is unsettled.169 Certainly, a cyber operation that causes significant physical 
damage or injury suffices, although consequences at this level are highly unlikely 
with respect to cyber election meddling. Whether nondestructive or injurious 
consequences that are severe would merit the use of force in self-defense is highly 
questionable. In the authors opinion, it is difficult to envision even internationally 
unlawful cyber election meddling that would, without more, allow the target State 
to resort to force in order to put an end to the operations. 
VI. REFLECTIONS ON GREY AREAS 
Cyber election meddling presently exists within the grey zone of 
international law. This zone of normative uncertainty presents a tempting 
environment for States that are not fully committed to the international rule of 
law. By operating within the grey zone, these States can avoid consensus 
condemnation of their cyber operations as violations of binding international legal 
norms. Moreover, absent a clear violation of international law attributable to the 
State launching the operationsand as the U.S. responses to date have 
demonstratedvictim State responses will generally be limited to acts of 
retorsion. 
As the international community struggles to identify how extant norms such 
as respect for sovereignty, the prohibition of intervention, and due diligence 
obligations apply to cyber operations, some of those involved in cyber law and 
policy are attempting to limit the reach of international law into cyberspace. For 
instance, the recent failure of the U.N. GGE to agree upon text for its aborted 
2017 report concerning such basic matters as applicability of the law of self-
defense and international humanitarian law, topics that they had addressed in 
previous reports, marks a major step backwards.170 That opposition to the text 
included Russia and China does not bode well for global cyber security or the rule 
of law more generally. Clearly, certain States are embracing legal ambiguity as a 
force multiplier in their cyber operations. In the realm of cyber election meddling, 
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the ambiguity stretches from an existential threat to sovereignty as a primary rule 
of law to confusion over the application of the coercion criterion to voting 
behavior. This ambiguity represents a troubling threat to the democratic process. 
Some States are taking the lead in attempting to shrink the grey zone. Efforts 
to bring like-minded States together to craft consensus are laudable. So too are 
cyber law capacity-building efforts such as the Netherlands Hague Process, in 
which the Netherlands sponsors regional training in collaboration with other 
States to construct common ground for future negotiations over the content, 
shape, and vector of international cyber law.171 
Ultimately, States need to make a choice. The grey zone represents both 
opportunity and threat. Until States exercise their prerogative to develop new 
norms and interpret existing ones in the context of cyber operations, those States 
that are not committed to a rule-based international order will enjoy an 
asymmetrical advantage over those that are dedicated to compliance with the law. 
And foreign elections will continue to represent a lucrative target in the strategies 
of the former. 
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